

JOURNAL OF RESPONSE TO READINGS

Monday, August 2:

1. American Empire Chapters. 1 & 2

**The author** of *American Empire* served as a military officer. Professor of International Relations and Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University.

The Preface enables us to guess where the author is coming from and going to and some background of American Empire.

**Events in 1940s – 1970** (McCarthyism and communist subversion, the nuclear arms race and the rise of the military-industrial complex, the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam, the assassination of one president and the toppling of another) – **divided people into opposing camps**: right and left, hawks (강경론자) and doves (온건파), anticommunists and anti-anticommunists, the uptight (긴장한) and the hip (히피족), the credulous (믿기쉬운) and the skeptical (회의적인).

**One group** accepted the orthodox interpretation that U.S. policies were necessary to defend the free world from communist aggression, actual or potential (check upon those who conspire against freedom).

**The other group** saw the American preoccupation with communism, at home and abroad, as unhealthy and unnecessary.

**The author** identify with the former group.

Whereas during the Cold War Americans had justified the maintenance of a great military establishment as a necessary departure from Founder's republican vision, they now flaunted (자랑하다) their nation's status as the world's only superpower.

The author joins others who are **troubled** by these developments especially by George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

**People who are troubled by such developments share two assumptions:**

1. The U.S. began to devise a new policy taking advantage of the end of the Cold War by the Soviet Union in 1989 that made U.S. the sole superpower of the world.
2. Critics interpreted that First Bush and then Clinton muffed (실수하다) that opportunity. American activity in the international arena during the 1990 – such as summits convened, agreement signed, interventions undertaken – was **ceaseless** but **aimless**.

Author perceives that what George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton were saying - freedom, world-peace, and global leadership was nothing but a pattern of grand strategy conceived many decades earlier and now adapted to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era.

**Note: if we read the statement of Woodrow Wilson, October 1900 in the end of the Preface, we can say the author's interpretation is right: .....** *no nation could live any longer to itself...It has become the duty of the United States to play a leading part.....the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it (East)...nations and peoples will be made part of the universal world of commerce...."*

Author raises questions as to the feasibility and cost and moral question about justification and consequences of such foreign policy.

Author is, therefore, stating that this book offers a critical interpretation of American statecraft (극작) in the 1990s.

It invites readers to reexamine the guiding principles and underlying purposes of U.S. foreign policy – they might become increasingly irrelevant.

Author perceives partisan debate over U.S. policy has reached a dead end.

To Americans frightened or bewildered by the events of September 11 and their aftermath, it posits(가정하다) at least one answer to the question  
**“how did we get there?”**

## **INTRODUCTION (p. 1-6)**

**Bill Clinton** and his secretary of state Madeline Albright, interpreted the end of the Cold War as signifying “the fullness of time” – a scriptural allusion to the moment when God chose to transform history. It is the United States, having ascended to the status of sole superpower, to complete God’s work – to guide history toward its intended destination. they said: “***The United States had emerged at the dawn of the new millennium as the “indispensable nation” endowed by providence with unique responsibilities and obligations***”.. Republicans endorsed the sentiment.”

However, author thinks the record of American statecraft in the 1990s was one of the opportunity wasted. Policy makers wasted time.

This book takes issue with that view.

***Purpose of those who chart America’s course is to preserve and, where both feasible and conducive to U.S. interests, to expand an American imperium. Central to this strategy is a commitment to global openness – removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.***

American policy makers perceived free enterprise and open world that is friendly to liberal values assure American prosperity and security.

The United States was determined to employ its dominant military power to thwart(좌절시키다) any challenge to its preeminence.

Many accepted it and others denounced U.S. hegemony as a variant of imperialism that will rely on repression and exploitation. Quelling the resistance mandates the use of force. As a result, not only the nurturing of military power but also its expenditure become integral to U.S. strategy.

Lord Ismay's famous description of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (**NATO**) several founding purposes capture the point:

The alliance was formed in 1949 to keep **the Russians out, the Americans in,** and **the Germans down.** It was a British perspective. Author thinks Americans would want to replace "**Americans on top** with **the Americans in.**"

The U.S. Intention of NATO was to secure America's position in Europe as a result of victory in the WWII.

**In short, U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War required not only containing communism but also taking active measures to open up the world politically, culturally, and, above all, economically – which is precisely what policymakers said they intended to do.**

**Truman's doctrine (1947) was** *interdependence of nations and indivisibility of peace which demanded the removal of barriers between nations. He called for "full exchange of knowledge, ideas, and information among the peoples of the earth, and maximum freedom in international travel and communication. He expressed support for "economic and financial policies to support a world economy rather than separate nationalistic economies."*

Crucial to this end was forming an International Trade Organization.

**Collapse** of communism at the end of the 1980s offered an unprecedented opportunity to fulfill Truman's vision.

Author claims that George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton revived the project that Truman had sketched in July 1947.

Whereas the orientation of U.S. policy had been primarily defensive, it now became offensive.

Those politics reflect a single-minded determination to extend and perpetuate American political, economic, and cultural hegemony-usually refer to as "leadership" – on a global scale.

## CHAPTER I. THE MYTH OF THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER

**The Myth of the Reluctant Superpower is a belief, in short, “U.S. was reluctant to be a super power but it happened:” He then presents U.S. history that carried on that belief (myth) into foreign policy including several wars. He presents prominent scholars who opposed and protested against such policies.**

America’s rise to power was not sought; it just happened. American policy is a response to external factors. The United States does not act in accordance with some predetermined logic; it reacts to circumstances. Although the events of 1898 accelerated its ascent to world power, the United States achieved preeminence not by consciously seeking it but simply as an unintended consequence of actions taken either in self-defense or on behalf of others.

**The following history/stories are told in the same breath to prove that only the evil spurred the United States into action.**

**In 1898, Americans chose war** only when the continuing depredations (약탈) of Spain’s General Valeriano (“Butcher”) Weyler in Cuba had become intolerable.

**In 1941, when the “Great War”** began the United States remained neutral, intervening only in response to Germany’s violation of U.S. neutral rights. United States fought for altruistic purposes, seeking to end war itself and to make the world safe for democracy.

**In the same way in 1939,** Americans didn’t fight until Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

**Even after the Cold War era,** distant events compelled the U.S. to perforce to expand its power. In 1990, Iraqi aggression threatened the West’s access to Persian Gulf oil obliged the U.S. to respond.

The heroes of the myth are “internationalists,” and opposing the internationalist are “isolationists.” Leading politicians and members of foreign policy establishment tried to inoculate (접종) susceptibility to the isolationist virus.

**The myth justifies** all the wars, foreign policies and trade and America's global dominance and builds trustworthiness and reliability of the government policy as described by Clinton in 1991 (p. 9); vindicate our nation's principles in the world against another totalitarian challenge to liberal democracy.

Republicans and Democrats are alike carry this common vision and myth.

**Dissenters** viewed those policies as wrongheaded, undemocratic, unnecessary and even dangerous. They formulated their own alternative to the myth of the reluctant superpower and campaigned.

The author presents the American historian, **Charles A. Beard (1874-1948)** as the most influential dissenters throughout the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

*Beard attend Quaker school, DePauw U, Oxford U. and founded Ruskin College, a school to provide educational opportunities for members of the British working class. In 1902 Beard returned to the United States and enrolled at Columbia U, earning his doctorate and became faculty of Columbia's history department, then among the country's most distinguished. Beard taught at Columbia until 1917, resigning in protest against the firing of a colleague who opposed U.S. entry into the European war.*

**Such backgrounds guide us to some preconception about his theory and approach.**

Beard published 42 volumes of history and political science and coauthored another 35.

**The author reports that Beard's view on foreign policy** amounted to a "tattered shambles (누더기 수라장" of interest only to crackpots and conspiracy theorists. Beard found himself in the last decade of his life denounced as a apologist of fascism (국가사회주의 변증론자), in the words of Lewis Mumford "a passive-no, active-abettor of tyranny (폭정의 선동자), sadism (잔학행위), human defilement (인간부정품). if by the end of Beard's life his reputation lay in ruins, it was because Beard himself put a torch to the edifice (건, 조직). In an extraordinary act of professional self-immolation (자기희생), he closed out his career by denouncing (공공연히 비난) as fraudulent (사기) the text most crucial to sustaining the myth of the reluctant superpower: the orthodox account (전통적인 이유) of U.S. entry into World War II.

**The author presents Beard's two volumes** – *American Foreign Policy in the Making* (1946) and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (1948) – in which **Beard accused Franklin Roosevelt of outright deception in his conduct of foreign affairs. Running in 1940 for a third term, FDR had declared and promised “your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” In doing so, Roosevelt, in Beard's view, had made a solemn covenant with the American people. Then the president violated that covenant by maneuvering the United States into it (p. 12).**

**Note: It seems to be a pattern of U.S. foreign policy all along.**

**Beard approached his task (p. 13)** by examining the past through the lens of political economy. His first major book *Economic Origins of the Constitution*, scandalized patriotic-minded defenders of historical orthodoxy by arguing that the farmers had pursued their task less under the spell of the high ideals of 1776 than with their eyes trained on the main chance. Encouraging commerce and manufacturers, protecting private property, establishing financial instruments essential for economic development.

“The Constitution” Beard concluded, “was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental rights of property are anterior (선행) to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities. Thus the metanarrative of the of *the Rise of American Civilization* portrays U.S. history as a dialectic(통용어) between the agrarian (농민/토지) ideal of Thomas Jefferson and the capitalist vision of Alexander Hamilton. **Note: I need some explanation on this.**

### **Beard's claim on the economic process**

**Meaning of the Civil War:** For Beard, the civil war – “second American Revolution” was not a dispute over slavery, union or state's rights, but a contest between two irreconcilable economic systems, each pushing to expand and facing inevitable decline.

On the one side was the burgeoning (싹트다) “industrial vortex (소용돌이)” of the North, on the other side a plantation economy confined to “ a limited territory with incompetent labor on soil of diminishing fertility. **Note: Why do you have to have war to solve this problem? Was there another alternative?**

Although in destroying slavery the North's victory brought some modest benefit to those freed from bondage, the real winners were rapacious (욕심많은) captains of industry in the North and, to a lesser extent, the South.

**For Beard, foreign policy derived from domestic policy.**

Its primary purpose was to advance commercial interests.

Revisionists characterized U.S. wartime policies as self-serving, reflecting an eagerness to cash in on Europe's misfortune.

A phony neutrality permitted a massive trade in arms with the Allies, propped up by American loans. The results at home was large profits for bankers and arms merchants and a general economic boom, sustainable only so long as the slaughter on the western front continued.

With perhaps the majority of Americans, Beard concluded by 1930 that U.S. entry into the war had been a mistake and that Wilson's peddling (행상하다) on the elixir (불로장생약) of internationalism had been tantamount to fraud( 사기에 방불했다).

**The next step**, as Beard pointed out, was that as the domestic market was saturated (포화상태) and capital heaped up for investment, the pressure for the expansion of the American commercial empire rose with corresponding speed. (the need of growth of trade and investment abroad).

**Great Depression a decade later**

**Beard charged** that 1) foreign policy and domestic policy "were parts of the same thing." 2) "nations are governed by their interests as their statesmen conceive these interests. In the case of the United States –whose chief business was economic considerations. Industrialists, bankers, and farmers – their advocates in Washington had concluded that the domestic market alone would not satisfy their own or the nation's requirements. American industry including capital and the product of American agriculture was producing more commodities than the American people can use or consume, and the 'surplus' must be exported. Leaders believed that failure to secure outlets for these surpluses would have ( and in 1930s was having) ruinous consequences causing widespread economic hardship but also threatening the social order.

**According to Beard** protecting that interests was the powerful motif through the state papers from inauguration of presidents.

To implement this strategy involved “pushing and holding open doors in all parts of the world with polite coercion to the use of arms.

**Beard faulted this strategy on five counts:**

1. The dream of endless economic expansion is illusory.
2. The more insistently the U.S. pressed to open the world, the greater the opposition it was likely to encounter.
3. In provoking resistance, Beard feared, opening doors to militarism at home. To overcome the resistance U.S. will use force. *Any nation “compelled to devote immense energies and large part of its annual wealth production to wars, to preparation for wars, and to paying for past wars” risked becoming Sparta, its civic and cultural institutions transformed into “the servants of military purposes and the military mind.”*
4. American political culture and the composition of American society were ill suited to such an expansionist strategy (divided ethnically and religiously).
5. The preoccupation with opening doors misconstrued (misread) the nation’s true interest. The nation’s true interests required statesmen to pursue economic objectives in a way “conducive to the promotion of individual and social virtues within the frame of national security.

**Note: How true his perception was in N. 1, 2, 3. and 5. We experienced 9/11 because our economic interest went beyond national security. Now we are living in fear of another attack and spend paramount funds to protect ourselves. How long can we do this?**

**Beard made very important points:**

*The problem was that an insufficient proportion of the population functioned as effective consumers. This was a by-product of an inequitable distribution of wealth for which we simply work on redistribution. He called attention to the country’s neglect of its own poor. **He proposed** as an alternative to opening doors abroad, to substitute an intensive cultivation of its own garden for a wasteful, quixotic, and ineffectual extension of interests beyond the reach of competent military and naval defense. He was emphasizing self-reliance and economic self-sufficiency. America should not look abroad for solutions to America’s problems at home.*

## **Author presents William Appleman Williams (1921-1990).**

He spent a year at Kemper Academy on a basketball scholarship and won an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy. Commissioned in 1944, Williams served until the war's end in the Pacific. 1947 he left the Navy to study history at the University of Wisconsin, an institution famous for its notorious loyalty to the teachings of Charles Beard. He then exposed himself to racial segregation and the embryonic civil rights movement, had begun his political awakening. At Wisconsin he earned a doctorate in U.S. diplomatic history.

Williams endorsed Beard's view that expansionism was integral to the American story. His central question was whether Americans would descend into shallow, grasping materialism or keep faith with the intentions of the Founders to create a "Christian commonwealth." As he saw it, Americans faced a choice. They could either give themselves over to the pursuit of hedonistic and ultimately dehumanizing individualism, or they could accept "the demands and the self-discipline of living with other human beings in a truly responsible, humane fashion.

But the United States pursued expansion abroad in a way that reflected particular American interests and values. After a brief, unsatisfactory experiment with old-fashioned empire in the wake of the Spanish-American War, American leaders abandoned efforts to assemble distant possessions given the cost of pacification, administration, and defense, colonies offered a poor return on the dollar. This challenge confronting American leaders was to formulate policies that provided the benefits of empire without its burdens.

To secure that access, American leaders devised a highly innovative strategy that Williams dubbed (named) "**Open Door imperialism.**" (John Hay, Secretary of State in 1899 and 1900). Hay's appeal to permit *U.S. access to China's market were expectations that Americans would reap more than their fair share of the benefits.*

In short, **the policy of the open door was "a classic strategy of non-colonial imperial expansion."** The policy devised for China applied equally well to other regions of the world. Williams concluded, "**the history of Open Door Notes became the history of American foreign relations.**" (p. 26).

### **Economic opportunity and political liberty.**

Expanding the marketplace enlarged the area of freedom.

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Openness became a precondition of freedom and democracy.

It implied stability and security.

Most Imperialists believed that an American empire would be humanitarian, and most humanitarian believed that doing good would be good for business.

**The open-door policy** legitimated “the endless expansion of the American frontier in the name of self-determination, progress and peace.”

Williams viewed the *WWII* as “*the war for the American Frontier.*”

Williams’s alternative to American expansionism was democratic socialism.

Socialism meant community which required radical decentralization. His alternative to empire was to dismantle the Union of fifty states, “breaking the Leviathan (거대한 배) into community-size elements. (p. 29). He didn’t make it.

### **From Williams’ effort to understand American power, four noteworthy points survived:**

1. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the U.S. came to play a role as a variant of empire equipped with troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators.
2. This informal empire “just grew like Topsy” coming into existence as accident of nature.
3. The essential aim of liberal internationalism was to open the world to American enterprise.
4. The only way to guarantee openness was through the exercise of dominant power.

*Whereas Beard first identified the underlying logic of American expansionism, William went a step further, urging Americans to contemplate (study carefully) the implications of their imperium. Assuming empire is necessary, what is the optimum size of the empire; and what are the proper – meaning moral as well as pragmatic – means of structuring, controlling, and defending the empire so that it will in practice produce welfare and democracy for the largest number of the imperial population?*

## CHAPTER 2, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CONCEITS (착상)

**Bill Clinton** – “America had come to define “the right side of history.”

“The world is growing smaller and smaller. From the strength of our economy to the safety of our cities, to the health of our people, depends on events not only within our border, but half a world away.” The world would become more like “us.”

**Madeline Albright** – “We have our own duty to be authors of history.”

Our way of life depends on a global economy. The idea of an ocean as protection is as obsolete as a castle moat.

**Secretary Cohen:** Everything was connected and everything was near at hand. Technology is actually miniaturizing the globe.

**Condoleezza Rice suggested** that the essential question was whether or not the United States was “going to accept responsibility for being on the right side of history.” If the nation failed to do so, missed opportunities would result and new threat to U.S. security emerge. The United States and allies are on the right side of history.” Consensus reigns on all but the extreme left and right.

Throughout the book the author states the Republicans and Democrats share such vision.

**Thomas L. Friedman**, foreign affairs columnist of the New York Times wrote

*“globalization is not just a trend, not just a phenomenon, not just an economic fact. It is the international system that has replaced the cold-war system.”*

Thus the post-Cold War era acquired a distinctive identity: it was the Age of Globalization.

Globalization was homogenization which meant Americanization –

with food, music, life style, language, technology.

Expanding economic pie, globalization also promised the creation of wealth benefiting all nations, but the United States most of all.

### **Conceit**

While Americans feel that they are chosen people – the Israel of our time, there are **three NOs**.

1. **No power politics ( Paul Wolfowitz plan) – p. 45-46**
- 2, **No to war:** Madeline suggested use of military power selectively and with restraint as a last resort. – Gulf war in 1990-1991.
3. **To limit (Tarnoff's Taboo).** who served Clinton as undersecretary of state. He cast doubt and limit of America's capability.

**America must lead. There is no other nation that can play this role. American must be a leader which involves (p. 52-53).**

Leadership imposed **obligation**, and it bestowed **prerogatives**.

Leadership confers **authority**.

It justifies the acquisition of immense **power**.

The leader does **not exploit** or dominate but **acts on behalf of** purposes that look beyond mere self-interest.

Leadership suggests an **ability to rally** others in a worthy cause.

Leadership may-at times, **must-act unilaterally** when consensus proves elusive.

Leadership implies influence.

Reputation and credibility matter.

Leadership is **never passive**.

Leadership is **not divisible**.

Leadership requires **vision and power**.

America's universal message was liberty, democracy, and market economy.

It was the time to apply the model for the rest of the world to adopt.

Continuing success of democratic capitalism at home dependent upon the creation of an integrated world order. For the world's well-being and its own, the United States had to seize that opportunity before it vanished.

Reinhold Niebuhr viewed that Americans view themselves as “tutors of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection. Yet Niebuhr fretted, that vocation of U.S. is fraught (가득 실은) with hazards, political, strategic, and above all, moral.

Niebuhr's contemporary George Kennan himself recognized those perils (danger).

## American Empire, chapters 3-6

### CHAPTER 3. POLICY BY DEFAULT (채무 불이행)

The author gave title of Chapter 3 “Policy by Default” in which starts out saying that in adapting U.S. foreign policy to the end of the Cold War, the contribution of the first Bush administration was tentative and incomplete.

The men forming the inner circle of Bush’s foreign policy and national security counselors – Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State James Baker. The Bush team lacked the hard ideological edge of the administration it replaced. They were stewards not visionaries, technocrats not philosophers, Author thinks Bush and his advisors never found a way to repackage American strategy in a way that took into account the rapidly changing circumstances triggered by the events of 1989.

In their book *A World Transformed*, coauthored by Bush and /Scowcroft, all but ignoring other significant events such as the U.S. invasion of Panama to overthrow Manuel Noriega and American policy toward China after the massacre in Tiananmen Square – authors largely confined their attention to two topics: reaching endgame with the Soviet and responding to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Bosnia civil war, U.S. intervention in Somalia, negotiation of North American Free Trade Agreement, and further jousting with Saddam Hussein was not mentioned.

If properly handled, **first** of all punishment of Iraqi aggression would restore the admonitory relevance of Munich. **Second** expeditious handling of the Gulf crisis would permit the United States to show that it had fully absorbed and digested the lessons of its own recent past (Vietnam War). **Third** ousting Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait would showcase the capabilities and competence of the U.S. military. such a demonstration would preempt anticipated calls for drastic cuts in defense spending. **Finally** the Gulf crisis would validate America’s continuing capacity to exercise global leadership.

In liberating Kuwait, the Bush administration made a clean sweep.

Iraqi aggression was turned back. New world was to come into view. However, contrary to expectations – liberation of Kuwait ended up peripheral (주변밖알).

However, the desert campaign broke Iraqi military power, setback to Saddam

Hussein's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and secured Western access to Persian Gulf. But few of the expected second-order benefits actually accrued.

**In 1989, massacre in Beijing's Tiananmen Square**, which was the site of popular demonstration demanding freedom and democracy for Chinese people. On June 3, heavily armed units of the People's Liberation Army brutally suppressed the demonstration and killed several hundred at least.

U.S. government didn't deal with issue right. At first furious but later apologized to keep U.S. relationship with China intact by sending emissary to China.

U.S. government gave China double message, first to punish but later wanted to keep the business as usual.

**Ethnic cleansing (Muslim) by Bosnia Serbs:**

On top of "blood for jobs" in Persian Gulf, Scowcroft toasting the Butchers of Beijing, and administration's Bosnia policy supporting the Serbs proved that reigning architects of U.S. foreign policy were morally obtuse (둔감한).

**Attack Panama and get Noriega out.**

**From 1950-1980 U.S. intervened in Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador.**

**Five ideas stand out (p. 72)** which is not new.

Interdependence

Commitment to global openness

Emphasis on free trade

American hegemony

Frequent reference to the bugbear of "isolationism"

*Bush as all other presidents throughout the century did declared that U.S. prosperity was dependent on economic conditions abroad. When growth slows abroad our own growth slows a well.*

In 1992 Bush's administration successfully negotiated **North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)** with Canada and Mexico and played a key role in founding **Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)**

Like other administration, Bush too claimed this is an age of interdependence, domestic prosperity, global economy, global peace, security, global trade, all intertwined. Therefore, the scope of U.S. interest was limitless.

He emphasized to reach out the rest of the world and keep the string of control in our hands including coercion.

Surprisingly Bush's success in the desert storm brought him a humiliating rejection by the people in the U.S. by not reelect him.